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Of Defense Lawyers and Pornographers:
Pretrial Asset Seizures
and the Fourth Amendment
RICARDO J. BASCUAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 2008, lawyers packed a federal courtroom in
Miami, Florida, in a show of support for Benedict Kuehne, who was to
be arraigned on money laundering charges.' Mr. Kuehne, widely
admired among his colleagues,2 had served as a president of the Florida
Bar and was among Al Gore's key legal advisors in the controversy that
decided the 2000 presidential election.' At the arraignment, Kuehne
proclaimed, "Since I am completely innocent of these charges, I am
entering a plea of not guilty."4
The Department of Justice alleges that Mr. Kuehne laundered pay-
ments made by Colombian drug trafficker Fabio Ochoa Vasquez to his
defense attorney, Roy Black.5 Mr. Black had retained Mr. Kuehne to
investigate and give an opinion as to whether the funds with which Mr.
Ochoa paid roughly $5 million in legal fees were drug proceeds.6 The
government contends that some funds that Mr. Ochoa used to pay Mr.
Black "consisted of, or were at least commingled with, proceeds of drug
trafficking"7 and seeks to forfeit over $5 million not from Mr. Black but
from Mr. Kuehne and his codefendants.8 According to the govern-
ment's bizarre indictment, some of the money declared by Mr. Kuehne
to be untainted by drug trafficking had in fact been provided by a federal
undercover operation to track drug proceeds.9 Thus, the government
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks to Samuel
Randall for his research assistance and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks
to Heidi Kitrosser for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Jay Weaver, Federal Court: Top Miami Lawyer Faces Money-Laundering Charges,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8, 2008, at A I.
2. See, e.g., Best Lawyer, MIAMI NEW TIMES, May 11, 2000, available at http://www.
miaminewtimes.com/2000-05-1 1/city-life/best-lawyer/full.
3. Weaver, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Superseding Indictment at 4, United States v. Velez, No. 05-20770 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15,
2007) [hereinafter Indictment].
6. See Weaver, supra note 1; Indictment, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Indictment, supra note 5, at 3.
8. Id. at 13. The codefendants are Colombian nationals who allegedly provided Mr. Kuehne
fraudulent information to support his opinion letters. See id. at 1-4.
9. Indictment, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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charges, Mr. Kuehne's opinion mischaracterized the source of the funds.
The only motive the indictment suggests for why Mr. Kuenhe would
risk his impeccable reputation and distinguished career was the payment
of less than $200,000 in fees-fees he would have earned even if his
investigation had revealed that Mr. Ochoa's money was tainted.' 0
Mr. Kuehne's controversial prosecution represents the govern-
ment's latest initiative in a decades-old campaign to keep criminal
defendants from using contested assets to hire defense counsel." Cur-
rent law, as interpreted by the courts, effectively places the burden of
establishing the source of a defendant's assets on the defense rather than
on the government.' 2 If defense counsel does not investigate his pro-
spective client's finances, the government may take the lawyer's earned
fees at the conclusion of the case. 3 Thus, the legal fees paid by Mr.
Ochoa are, as the government points out, subject to civil forfeiture if the
defense team "knew or should have known" they were tainted.'4 Mr.
Black's firm, however, could use Mr. Kuehne's opinion letters to defend
against such a civil forfeiture action.
By electing instead to bring a criminal prosecution against the
author of the opinion letters, the government undertakes to meet a higher
burden of proof than it would face in a civil forfeiture action. It must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rather than proving liability by a
preponderance of evidence. It also has to prove not only that the funds
were illicit but that Mr. Kuehne actually knew they were.I5 The govern-
ment cannot rely on the "should-have-known" negligence standard that
suffices to prove civil claims.
16
In light of these challenges, it is doubtful that the government
brought the criminal case against Mr. Kuehne because it was the best or
easiest way to recover $5 million for the Treasury. The government will
10. Id. at 5.
11. See Brian Fork, Comment, The Federal Seizure of Attorneys' Fees in Criminal Forfeiture
Actions and the Threat to the American System of Criminal Defense, 83 N.C. L. REV. 205, 224-25
(2004) (discussing similar prosecutions).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (2000) ("Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a
person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter
shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing ...
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section."); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2000) (same).
14. Indictment, supra note 5, at 2.
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2000).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding that
"deliberate ignorance" instruction should rarely be given to avoid the risk "that juries will convict
on a basis akin to a standard of negligence: that the defendant should have known that the conduct
was illegal").
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attain a valuable benefit and disturbing "victory" just by having the case
proceed to trial, regardless of the outcome. The chilling effect this case
will have (and perhaps has had already) will further the DOJ's efforts to
discourage privately retained counsel from defending-or, indeed, hav-
ing any involvement whatsoever with-those accused of drug or racke-
teering crimes.' 7 The government is able to accomplish this only
because the muddled jurisprudence of forfeiture, in disregard of the
Fourth Amendment, essentially treats assets that are alleged to be tainted
as presumptively tainted.
To date, the cases examining pretrial restraining orders on an
accused's money have asked whether such restraints infringe the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to due pro-
cess. Framing the issue in terms of the right to counsel has produced a
confused jurisprudence in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit is a curious outlier. That court's decision in United
States v. Bissell 8 is understood to hold that assets needed by a defendant
to pay his counsel of choice can be restrained in advance of trial without
an adversarial hearing. 9 Not surprisingly, then, the case has been uni-
versally criticized and followed in no other circuit.2 0
Ten years after Bissell, another Eleventh Circuit panel noted with
apparent discomfiture that "in the appropriate case, we perhaps should
re-examine Bissell ..... " At least one case pending before the court as
of this writing, United States v. Kaley, offers the Eleventh Circuit the
opportunity to revisit Bissell and provide some sort of pretrial hearing at
17. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 720 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Counsel
inevitably will be reluctant or unwilling to accept private employment knowing that they may not
be able to collect or retain agreed-upon fees." (quoting United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 921
(4th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto I1), 852 F.2d 1400, 1403 (2d Cir. 1988)
(Feinberg, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he 'relation back' provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) has the same
effect as a restraining order when applied to attorney's fees, since practical considerations will
keep an attorney from accepting fees based upon the contingency of success at the criminal
trial."); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("By the Sixth
Amendment we guarantee the defendant the right of counsel, but by the forfeiture provisions of
the RICO and CCE statute (if they apply to the fee of the defense attorney), we insure that no
lawyer will accept the business."); Fork, supra note 11, at 232; Lindsey N. Godfrey, Note,
Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Commonsense Approach to Asset
Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1699, 1717-18 & nn.141-45 (2001) (collecting news stories on
chilling effect of forfeiting legal fees and on attorneys charged with money laundering).
18. 866 F.2d 1343 (11 th Cir. 1989).
19. See United States v. Melrose E. Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493, 500 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The
Eleventh Circuit, on the contrary, holds that no pretrial hearing is required under 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e) even when the restrained assets are needed to pay counsel."); United States v. Register,
182 F.3d 820, 835 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("We appear to be the only circuit holding that, although pre-
trial restraint of assets needed to retain counsel implicates the Due Process Clause, the trial itself
satisfies this requirement.").
20. See infra note 42.
21. Register, 182 F.3d at 835.
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which an accused can challenge restraints on his property.22 The Elev-
enth Circuit will likely afford in Kaley or a similar case some pretrial
process to defendants seeking to use restrained assets to pay attorney's
fees. Kaley, however-like virtually every federal case on this issue-
frames the matter as an infringement of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel without due process.23 A Sixth Amendment approach will do
little to free criminal defense attorneys from having to prove conclu-
sively that the money they earn is not tainted at the risk of working for
free or, worse yet, being indicted for money laundering. It will not dis-
courage the government from pursuing aggressive strategies like the
prosecution of Mr. Kuehne to limit the availability of talented criminal
defense counsel. A more fundamental reconceptualization of pretrial
restraint of assets is needed to minimize the threat of such prosecutions
and to protect an accused's right to defend against serious charges.
This article posits that the issue of whether a defendant may use
money in his possession to retain an attorney must be examined prima-
rily as a Fourth Amendment question rather than primarily as a Sixth
Amendment question. Using established Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence has several advantages over viewing a pretrial seizure of assets as
an incursion on only the right to counsel. First, it leaves no doubt that
the government has the burden of adducing specific facts to demonstrate
that particular assets are traceable to particular crimes. This is conso-
nant not only with the presumption of innocence, but also with recogni-
tion that affording talented and aggressive representation to those
accused of even heinous crimes is a defining characteristic of the Ameri-
can adversarial system of criminal justice.24
Second, a Fourth Amendment approach still affords consideration
of a challenged seizure's Sixth Amendment implications. However,
because every seizure triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny, defendants
would no longer be required to demonstrate an impact on the right to
counsel just to prove their entitlement to a hearing. Instead, a hearing
would be presumptively required, just as it is when the government
seizes expressive works that may be protected by the First Amend-
ment.25 A seizure of assets that an accused intends to use for his defense
should be met with the same heightened judicial concern as a seizure of
books or films. The Supreme Court, however, has been more willing to
22. United States v. Kaley, No. 07-80021-CR, 2007 WL 1831151 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2007).
23. Id. at *2.
24. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 635 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (noting "the devastating consequences of attorney's fee forfeiture for the integrity
of our adversarial system of justice"); Fork, supra note 11, at 232-33 (discussing how forfeiture
of attorney's fees thins ranks of skilled defense attorneys).
25. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 67 (1989).
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accept, in the name of the Constitution, the risk that pornographers will
propagate obscenity than the risk that an accused would pay his attorney
with tainted funds. Viewing pretrial asset seizures as raising Fourth
Amendment issues ensures that the government will have to make some
evidentiary showing to restrain money that a defendant might use for
attorney's fees.
Lastly, a Fourth Amendment approach forces recognition of the
fact that attorneys who are paid for legal services rendered before the
government has made the required probable cause showing ought to be
entitled to the money they earned. While the government cannot remove
an allegedly obscene book from circulation before proving that it is
obscene, under current law it can prevent an accused from using con-
tested assets to fund his defense with little more than an allegation. A
Fourth Amendment approach would expose this anomaly and dispel the
unmerited cloud of ignobility and the spectre of criminal exposure that
current law casts upon those who undertake to provide constitutionally
guaranteed representation.
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO PRETRIAL RESTRAINTS
Two federal statutes provide for the criminal forfeiture of the pro-
ceeds and instrumentalities of crime. One is aimed at racketeers. 26 The
other targets drug traffickers. 27 Because no one seriously argues that
criminals are entitled to the fruits of their illicit labors, forfeiture is not a
controversial penalty. But the statutes' provision that assets "subject to
forfeiture" may be frozen before trial has been said to infringe upon the
presumption of innocence and the right to retain counsel of choice.28 In
1989, the Supreme Court rejected these contentions. It held that money
used to pay for defense counsel is not exempt from the forfeiture stat-
utes 29 and that assets needed for attorney's fees could be restrained
pending trial.3" The Supreme Court did not decide what process was
necessary to effect a pretrial seizure of assets alleged to be forfeitable.31
That open question has caused a splintering among the circuits over
what the rights to counsel and due process require in those circum-
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto I1i), 491 U.S. 600, 614-16 (1989); Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 650-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 720 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Pre-conviction restraining orders and, indeed, the
mere threat of ultimate forfeiture without any such orders operate directly and immediately to
inhibit a defendant's ability to retain private counsel for his defense.").
29. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 619.
30. Monsanto II1, 491 U.S. at 602.
31. Id. at 615 n.10.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
stances. The split has resulted because the issue presented by a pretrial
asset seizure has been poorly framed. Predicating a challenge to a freez-
ing order on a right-to-counsel argument fundamentally misconceives
the relief sought as being exceptional. In other words, it suggests, if not
implies, that were the assets intended for something other than retaining
counsel, the government would be entitled to freeze them. This tacit
concession inspires exactly the rejoinder one would expect. Justice
White, writing for the Supreme Court in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, inveighed against the notion that the right to counsel
entitles (alleged) criminals to use illegitimate wealth to hire high-priced
lawyers:
A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's
money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are
the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of
his choice. A robbery suspect, for example, has no Sixth Amendment
right to use funds he has stolen from a bank to retain an attorney to
defend him if he is apprehended. The money, though in his posses-
sion, is not rightfully his; the Government does not violate the Sixth
Amendment if it seizes the robbery proceeds and refuses to permit
the defendant to use them to pay for his defense.
32
Hyperbole notwithstanding, the reasoning is sound as far as it goes.
Whatever the Sixth Amendment provides, it is not that one can keep or
use ill-gotten assets merely because one is in possession of them. None-
theless, litigants and courts have consistently and futilely framed cases
concerning the forfeitability of funds that could be used to retain counsel
as Sixth Amendment actions.33 In United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto
III), in which the Supreme Court held that forfeitable assets could be
restrained pending trial, this made sense.34 The lawyers in that case
were afforded "an adversarial hearing 'at which the government has the
burden to demonstrate the likelihood that the assets are forfeitable.'""
Because the government met that burden, the only remaining argument
was to claim a categorical exception from pretrial restraining orders for
32. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 626; see also United States v. Register, 182
F.3d 820, 835 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The right to counsel of choice belongs solely to criminal
defendants possessing legitimate, uncontested assets ..... The appellants here had no Sixth
Amendment right to use assets to the extent that those assets belonged to the United States.")
(quoting United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (1 1th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis added); David
Orentlicher, Fee Payments to Criminal Defense Lawyers from Third Parties: Revisiting United
States v. Hodge and Zweig, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1083, 1083-84 (2000) (arguing that attorney fee
payments made by third-party criminal associates work to further criminal conspiracies).
33. See, e.g., Todd Barnet & Ivan Fox, Trampling on the Sixth Amendment: The Continued
Threat of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 22 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 & nn.3-13 (1995).
34. Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 600.
35. Id. at 605 (quoting United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto 1), 836 F.2d 74, 84 (2d Cir.
1987)).
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assets earmarked for attorney's fees-a claim that only the Sixth
Amendment could arguably support.3 6 The Supreme Court held only
that the Sixth Amendment does not exempt assets to be used for attor-
ney's fees from being restrained pending trial once the government dem-
onstrates probable cause to believe the assets are forfeitable. 37  It
expressly did not decide whether any pretrial hearing on the question of
forfeitability must be afforded the defendant.38
After Monsanto III, however, litigants continued to seek pretrial
hearings on the basis of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 3 9-which
makes a good deal less sense than it did prior to that decision. Perhaps
this was the result of a tendency to want to build on Monsanto III's and
Caplin & Drysdale's reasoning. Or the root of the confusion may be
that the attorneys who frame these claims are predisposed to view the
matter in somewhat self-interested terms, i.e., whether prospective cli-
ents have a right to hire them. In other words, a lawyer may be more
immediately concerned with establishing his right to the money than
with establishing his client's right to spend it as he will. n° In actuality,
of course, the question is simply whether the government has shown that
the accused should be prevented from doing whatever he wishes with
property that is in his possession and therefore presumably his. The fact
that he wants to hire a criminal defense attorney is hardly irrelevant but
neither does it drive the analysis.
Whatever the cause of the misconception, the result is that the cir-
cuits have splintered over what procedure to afford a defendant chal-
lenging a pretrial seizure of assets.4 Only the Eleventh Circuit does not
require any hearing before the government can have allegedly forfeitable
36. Id. at 602.
37. Id. at 616.
38. Id. at 615 n.10.
39. See, e.g., United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411,418 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States
v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 646 (10th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 1994); Bamet & Fox,
supra note 33, at 1-2 & nn.3-13.
40. A court decision that a defendant could spend his money only on attorney's fees would be
of obvious benefit to that defendant's lawyer.
41. These seizures are typically effected by an ex parte warrant or ex parte restraining order
issued pursuant to the forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d at 412; Jones, 160 F.3d
at 643; United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1347 (11 th Cir. 1989). Despite the failure of
litigants and courts to treat challenges to these orders as Fourth Amendment claims, there is no
doubt that they implicate the Fourth Amendment. "A 'seizure' of property ... occurs when 'there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.'"
Soldal v. Cook County, II1., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984)); cf United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54 (1993)
(holding that seizure of real estate in connection with civil forfeiture claim interfered with
"valuable rights of ownership").
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assets frozen.4 2 Other circuits require the government to establish the
likely validity of its claim in each individual case through a pretrial
adversarial hearing. The particular procedure varies from circuit to cir-
cuit, with the Ninth imposing the most elaborate process.43 To restrain
assets before trial in the Ninth Circuit, the government must satisfy the
requirements that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 establishes for
temporary restraining orders." The Third Circuit similarly requires a
full hearing where the government must demonstrate that it is likely to
prove at trial both that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense and
that the profits or properties are subject to forfeiture. 45 The Second and
District of Columbia circuits require a pretrial hearing at which the
defendant can contest not only that there is probable cause to believe the
assets are tainted by crime but also that probable cause supports the
underlying charges, even though an indictment ordinarily establishes
42. Compare Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1354 with E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d at 421 ("[W]here the
government has obtained a seizure warrant depriving defendants of assets pending a trial upon the
merits, the constitutional right to due process of law entitles defendants to an opportunity to be
heard at least where access to the assets is necessary for an effective exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."); and United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 493
F.3d 469, 475-77 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that availability of adversarial hearing is resolved
through Mathews v. Eldridge test); and Jamieson, 427 F.3d at 407 (approving district court's
application of the framework laid out by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jones, which allows
a hearing provided the defendant can show that the seizure interferes with the right to counsel, and
that the funds seized are not illegally derived); and Jones, 160 F.3d at 647 ("We think the proper
balance of private and government interests requires a post-restraint, pre-trial hearing but only
upon a properly supported motion by a defendant [demonstrating that the seizure precludes his
ability to hire counsel]."); and United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto IV), 924 F.2d 1186, 1191 (2d
Cir. 1991) (" '[A] pre-trial adversary hearing is required where the question of attorney's fees is
implicated.'") (quoting United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto 1), 836 F.2d 74, 82 n.7 (2d Cir.
1987)); and United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 731 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that denial
of a hearing "violates the due process clause to the extent that it actually impinges on the
defendant's qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of choice"); and United States v. Harvey,
814 F.2d 905, 929 (4th Cir. 1987) ("We therefore hold that to the extent the Act authorizes the
issuance of ex parte restraining orders after indictment without any post-deprivation hearing other
than a criminal trial, it violates fifth amendment due process guarantees, and that as applied
specially in Harvey's case, it violated his fifth amendment rights to procedural due process.")
(second and third emphasis added); and United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding due process requires an adversarial hearing and that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 will govern forfeiture hearings); and United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d
Cir. 1981) ("Before a court can issue such a restraining order, however, the government must
demonstrate that it is likely to convince a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of two things: one, that
the defendant is guilty of violating the [charged offense] and two, that the profits or properties at
issue are subject to forfeiture .... In addition, these determinations must be made on the basis of a
full hearing; the government cannot rely on indictments alone.") (citations omitted).
43. Crozier, 777 F.2d at 1384. The Fifth Circuit used to do this, but stopped last year.
Compare United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1469 (5th Cir. 1986) with Holy Land Found. for
Relief & Dev., 493 F.3d at 475-77.
44. Id.
45. Long, 654 F.2d at 915.
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probable cause conclusively.46 The Tenth and Sixth circuits require a
hearing on whether there is probable cause to believe contested assets
are tainted-but only after the defendant demonstrates that the assets are
needed for attorney's fees.47
This divergence of views is not surprising given that framing the
issue in Sixth and Fifth Amendment terms leaves each circuit to decide
the amorphous and open-ended question of what process is due.48 To
achieve consistency across circuits and with closely related precedent,
the question of whether the government can seize assets that could fund
a criminal defense must be analyzed in the same way as any seizure. It
is true that whatever protections the Fourth Amendment offers should be
observed particularly scrupulously when a mistake would directly
impact on another constitutional right, such as the right to counsel.49
But the question of whether the government may seize property in any
given circumstance must consistently be answered with reference to the
same body of Fourth Amendment law if constitutional law is to make
principled sense. Though the opinion is nothing like clear, Bissell hints
at such an approach.
III. BISSELL'S CONFUSED REASONING
Bissell evinces considerable confusion as to the source of the gov-
ernment's authority to seize allegedly forfeitable assets without a pretrial
hearing.50 The court's opinion emphasized a property rights theory, stat-
ing that it had to consider "the government's claim to title in the
assets."5 Relying on the statutes' relation-back provision, which pro-
vides that the government's title to forfeited assets vests at the time the
crime was committed,5" Bissell maintained that the government's claim
simply trumps the defendant's in every case: "The reason for restricting
the defendant's control over allegedly illicit assets is to preserve the
government's claim of ownership to these assets and to protect its right
46. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d at 419; Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1196-97.
47. Jamieson, 427 F.3d at 407; Jones, 160 F.3d at 647.
48. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. circuits all rely on the multi-factor approach
of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d at 416-20; Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev., 493 F.3d at 476; Jones, 160 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 1998); Monsanto IV,
924 F.2d at 1193; United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 1988).
49. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) ("Where the materials
sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude.'"); Nathan v. Lawton, No. 487-223,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1398, at *23-24 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 18, 1989) (applying heightened scrutiny to
a search of an attorney's office).
50. See United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1354 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
51. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2000).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to possession of the assets when and if its claim is vindicated at trial."53
The court disregarded the defendants' competing claim and pressing
need for the assets, repeatedly referring to the defendants' lack of
"uncontested assets" and even declaring that "the inclusion of appel-
lants' assets in an indictment is an assertion that these particular defend-
ants, no matter what the appearances of wealth may be, are and have
been paupers ever since their apparent assets were accumulated through
criminal conduct.
54
Though Monsanto III had not been decided yet, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the forfeiture statutes make no exception for attor-
ney's fees.5 It further held that the Sixth Amendment does not entitle a
defendant to use "contested assets" to pay attorney's fees: "The correct
position is that none of the defendants have ever owned any of these
assets. All of the assets were the property of the government the moment
they were derived from, or utilized in, the criminal activities con-
demned."56 This reasoning is flawed, not only because it assumes the
defendant's guilt, but more fundamentally because the matter of when
title vests is irrelevant. The issue is whether the government will likely
prevail on its claim.
Bissell ignored that by denying guilt, the defendants likewise
claimed the contested assets and disputes that the government has any
right to restrict his use of them pending trial. Other than the court's
evident antipathy for the defendants it characterized as "paupers," the
case offered no explanation for why, in the absence of any evidentiary
showing, the government's assertion of a right to freeze the assets is
superior to the defendants' assertion of a right to use the assets. To be
sure, the court did say that the defendants failed to argue "that the gov-
ernment restrained non-forfeitable assets," but it meant only that the
defendants did not claim the assets were outside the scope of the forfei-
ture statute.57 The defendants certainly argued that they were entitled to
a hearing on the ultimate question of whether the government was likely
to substantiate its forfeiture claim. 8
Addressing the issue of procedure, the Eleventh Circuit deployed a
Fourth Amendment analysis, faulting the defendants for the denial of
53. Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1349.
54. Id. at 1351.
55. Id. at 1350 ("The language and legislative history of section 853 evidence Congress' goal
of reaching as many illegal assets as constitutionally permissible.").
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1351.
58. Id. at 1352 ("They argue that when pretrial restraints are imposed on assets, the Fifth
Amendment requires a hearing on the merits at which the government must prove the probability
that the defendant will be convicted and that his assets will be forfeited.").
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any process. The court held that delaying consideration of the question
of forfeitability until trial did not violate due process, given that the
record disclosed no motion for a pretrial hearing or for the return of
property pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41." That rule
implements the Fourth Amendment's regulation of searches and seizures
by providing, among other things, for the return of unlawfully seized
property. 60  The court's premise that the government had already
acquired a statutory property interest in the contested assets would have
rendered any such motion an empty exercise because the defendants
would have no right to demand the return of property that was not theirs.
The court buttressed the government's ownership of the contested assets
by noting that the trial court had found probable cause (on an ex parte
basis) to issue warrants freezing the defendants' bank accounts.6'
Bissell thus effectively held that no process was necessary to deter-
mine the validity of the government's claim because the claim estab-
lished its own validity. The court treated "the government's claim to
title," which derived from the forfeiture statute, as a fact separate and
distinct from whether there was probable cause to believe the contested
assets were forfeitable. The government's supposed property interest
was a factor that weighed against finding a due process violation.62 The
ex parte probable cause finding was another. 63 Finally, the failure to
bring a Rule 41 motion was yet another.64 But these considerations are
all one and the same. In the typical criminal forfeiture case like Bissell,
any claim the government has to contested assets is only as good as the
evidence showing those assets are derived from criminal activity.65
Without some proof of its allegations, the government has no claim to
the defendant's property. And probable cause for such a seizure cannot
be reliably established ex parte.66
59. Id. at 1353.
60. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558 (1978)
(stating that Rule 41 "reflects '[t]he Fourth Amendment's policy against unreasonable searches
and seizures'") (alteration in original).
61. Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1354.
62. Id. ("[O]ur due process analysis must countenance not only the possible prejudice to
appellants' Sixth Amendment rights, but also the government's claim to title in the assets.").
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1353.
65. The property interest and probable cause inquiries would be distinct only in the odd case,
such as if the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering that involved stealing government
property or sold drugs stolen from a Veteran's Administration hospital. Then, the government
would have a property interest as the victim of the crime and a separate interest in forfeiting the
proceeds as sovereign.
66. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment's
Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment probable cause determinations cannot be made reliable without adversarial testing of
the government's claims).
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Just as Justice White's majority would do in Caplin & Drysdale,
the Bissell panel supported its holding with the seemingly indisputable
observation that one accused of bank robbery could not use the stolen
bank money to retain counsel.67 Differences between the cases, how-
ever, made the hypothetical inapt in Bissell. In Caplin & Drysdale, the
law firm petitioner sought payment for services rendered in major part
after its client pled guilty to the underlying charges.68 Because the for-
feitability of all the client's assets was thus already established at the
time it performed the pertinent legal work, the firm could distinguish the
bank robbery hypothetical only with the strained argument that the bank
enjoys "pre-existing property rights, while the [g]overnment's claim to
forfeitable assets rests on . . . the fictive property-law concept of...
relation-back and is merely a mechanism for preventing fraudulent con-
veyances of the defendant's assets, not ... a device for determining true
title to property."69 The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating
that criminal defendants have no right "to use assets that are the Govern-
ment's-assets adjudged forfeitable... -to pay attorney's fees, merely
because those assets are in their possession."7 Bissell's reliance on the
bank robbery hypothetical to support a seizure of assets on the basis of
little more than a government allegation, as opposed to a judgment, goes
further than logic permits.
The bank robber hypothetical implicitly posits that the money dis-
covered in the suspect's possession is in some way-by virtue perhaps
of the bag it is in, the serial numbers on the bills, or marks from an
exploding ink pack-identifiable as the very money stolen from the
bank. Title to the money is never in doubt. Caplin & Drysdale
presented such a case but Bissell did not. If police discovered that a
person suspected of robbing $50,000 from a bank had exactly $50,000 in
his own savings account, the police could hardly seize his account with-
out first showing it constituted proceeds of the bank robbery. If the
defendant could show he funded the account before the bank was
robbed, nothing would prevent him from using the money to hire a law-
yer.71 But the alleged bank robber would not have the burden to demon-
67. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989); Bissell, 866
F.2d at 1351 (relying on In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en banc)).
68. See In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d at 641.
69. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 626 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 632.
71. This implicates the doctrine of forfeiture of substitute assets. Most courts have held that
substitute assets, i.e., assets of lesser or equal value to forfeitable proceeds of crime which may be
forfeited when the actual proceeds have been dissipated, are not subject to pretrial restraint. See,
e.g., United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the RICO statute "does
not authorize the pretrial restraint of substitute assets"). This is in keeping with the idea that,
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strate any such thing. On the contrary, the Fourth Amendment provides
that the property could not be seized unless the prosecution demon-
strated at least a likelihood that the savings account represented the pro-
ceeds of the bank robbery.72
Thus, the reason that the hypothetical bank robber cannot use the
money in his possession to pay his legal fees (or to buy anything) is
embedded in the hidden premise that there exists some proof that the
particular money he has is the very money taken from the bank. To the
extent that the government can seize and retain the money, even though
it belongs to the bank, it is only because the money is evidence of a
crime.7 The government's right to take it from the defendant is not
dependent on the government having a superior interest like that embod-
ied in the relation-back provision of the forfeiture statutes.74 More
importantly, the legality of the seizure does not depend on the defendant
being guilty of the bank robbery. Even if he has an innocent explanation
for how the marked bills came to be in his possession (perhaps his room-
mate is the thief), there is no doubt that the money does not belong to
him, just as there was no doubt in Caplin & Drysdale that the defen-
dant's money belonged to the government once he pled guilty.
Bissell failed to recognize that assets alleged to be forfeitable as
proceeds of a crime differ from money robbed from a bank and assets
already forfeited because the defendant's claim to the assets has not
been resolved or extinguished. The government's right to possess those
assets is necessarily tied to whether the defendant committed the under-
lying offense. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that depriving the
absent probable cause to believe a particular item is the fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a
crime, the Fourth Amendment bars its seizure. The forfeiture of substitute assets is essentially
another name for a criminal fine incurred upon conviction. The rationale of this article suggests
that substitute assets should never be subject to pretrial restraint, but an extended discussion of
this is beyond this work's reach.
72. If the government cannot establish at least probable cause to believe that contested assets
will be forfeited, then there is no obvious reason why a defendant cannot, in fact, use those assets
for whatever he wishes, whether it is to exercise a constitutional right or not. Viewed most
favorably to the government, that situation presents a court with competing unsubstantiated claims
to an asset. Presumably, the defendant's possession of the asset under color of title would be the
salient factor to resolve the impasse. See infra note 136.
73. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 578-79 & n.5 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
74. The Supreme Court dispensed with any need to predicate the government's right to seize
on that particular legal fiction in Warden v. Hayden, in which police seized clothing worn by a
suspected robber. 387 U.S. at 296-97. The Court recognized that "mere evidence" could be
seized, even though the government could not claim a property interest in it, as long as there was
probable cause "to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or
conviction." Id. at 307. The hypothetical bank robber's money can be seized if there is probable
cause to believe it is evidence of a crime, just as the identifying clothing worn by the robber in
Hayden could be seized from the basement of the house to which the robber fled. Id. at 312.
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defendant of use of the assets before trial increases the likelihood that he
will (perhaps unjustly) be convicted and that the government will be
awarded the assets. Failing to distinguish between a judgment of forfei-
ture and an allegation of forfeiture, Bissell failed to grapple with this
problem. It leapt to the unsupported conclusion that an indictment alone
might suffice to support the pretrial seizure of contested assets and that
an indictment together with an ex parte probable cause finding certainly
does.
IV. ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE To FORFEIT CONTESTED
ASSETS
Bissell is of course correct that the listing of assets in an indictment
is an assertion of forfeitability, but it makes a great deal of difference
whose assertion it is, what the nature of the assertion is, and what basis
underlies it. If it is nothing but the untested claim of the prosecution, it
lacks any legal significance. A bare assertion that assets are forfeitable
is insufficient to demonstrate even probable cause to seize an individ-
ual's property. As courts routinely instruct jurors, an indictment is not
evidence.
75
An indictment, however, is taken to embody a grand jury's finding
of probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the charged
crimes.76 Thus, it matters whether a forfeiture claim in an indictment is
an assertion of the grand jury and, even if it is, whether that alone is
sufficient to overcome an accused's right to use what is presumably his
property. In Monsanto III, the Supreme Court declined to decide
whether due process required an adversarial hearing to determine proba-
ble cause because the district court had conducted a four-day hearing at
which the government prevailed.77 After Monsanto III, the courts of
appeals have remained divided over what significance to ascribe to an
indictment when a pretrial restraint is challenged. The division reveals
that the federal courts maintain a usually unarticulated but consistently
evident discomfort with Bissell's syllogistic equating of an indictment
with probable cause in the pretrial restraint context.
On remand from Monsanto III, the Second Circuit determined that,
even assuming a forfeiture count in an indictment constitutes a grand
jury's probable cause determination, due process requires that the
accused be afforded an adversarial pretrial hearing to contest a seizure.
78
Because the DOJ agreed with that conclusion and six other courts of
75. See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1035 n.28 (11th Cir. 2005).
76. See, e.g., Afanasjev v. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1165 n.II (11th Cir. 2005).
77. United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto 111), 491 U.S. 600, 615 n.10 (1989).
78. United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto IV), 924 F.2d 1186, 1193-94 (2d. Cir. 1991).
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appeals had ruled the same way, the Second Circuit reasoned that an
indictment could not conclusively establish probable cause that listed
assets were forfeitable. 79 The government maintained, however, that the
indictment should be taken as establishing probable cause for the
charges underlying the forfeiture.80 Thus, the adversarial hearing should
be limited to determining whether there was probable cause to believe
the seized property constituted proceeds of crime.8' The Second Circuit
decided, however, that the indictment's effect should be the same as to
both questions.82 It ruled that a defendant could challenge the existence
of probable cause for the charges underlying the forfeiture claim as well
as for forfeitability itself.
8 3
Without deciding what exactly a forfeiture claim in an indictment
signifies, the Tenth Circuit adopted a more narrow view of due process
in United States v. Jones.84 Relying on legislative history and presum-
ing that a forfeiture provision in an indictment entails a grand jury's
probable cause determination, the court first held that there was no statu-
tory right to a pretrial probable cause hearing. It also held, however,
that the Constitution requires that a defendant who demonstrates that she
has no other assets "with which to retain private counsel and provide for
herself and her family" is entitled to a hearing on the question of "trace-
ability of the assets."86 The indictment would serve as conclusive evi-
dence of probable cause to believe the underlying offenses had been
committed but not probable cause to believe the assets were
forfeitable.87
The Tenth Circuit did not expressly address why the forfeiture
claim should be treated differently than the charges. On the contrary, the
court claimed that,
despite the fact that criminal forfeiture is ordinarily not a part of the
substantive offense, but is instead a part of the sentence, a grand jury
is necessarily called upon in this context to find probable cause to
believe the assets named in the indictment are traceable to the under-
lying offense.88
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Fifth Amendment required a
79. Id. at 1191 (collecting cases).
80. Id. at 1196.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1196-97.
83. Id. at 1197.
84. 160 F.3d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 644 (relying on S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 203, 213 (1984)).
86. Id. at 647, 648.
87. Id. at 648.
88. Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
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hearing in some cases for a judge to make that same finding again.89
This unexplained difference in treatment must be grounded on the
idea that grand juries do not, in fact, make reliable findings regarding the
source of allegedly forfeitable assets.90 The decisions of other courts
reflect this same lack of confidence that grand juries give serious consid-
eration to the forfeitability of assets. That is implicit in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's finding, for example, that "[t]he risk of an erroneous deprivation
... is high" if assets are restrained without a prompt, adversarial hearing
on probable cause. 91 The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a
case in which the government again conceded that an adversarial hearing
should be provided to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe restrained assets are forfeitable.9"
Neither the DOJ nor any federal appellate decision (other than Bis-
sell) maintains that an indictment with a forfeiture claim represents any-
thing more than the government's allegation that certain assets are
forfeitable. If it is true that an indictment does not constitute a probable
cause determination as to forfeitability of assets, then the Fourth
Amendment stands in the way of any pretrial restraint on property. It
requires that the government adduce evidence demonstrating that the
contested property is derived from crime. Furthermore, that showing
must be tested at an adversarial hearing. This is because established law
prescribes that, when a government seizure might directly compromise
the exercise of another constitutional right, "the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude."' 93
Further still, the fact that the seizure will preclude the exercise of
another constitutional right argues, despite Monsanto III's holding to the
contrary, for a quantum of proof greater than probable cause.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale were not the only forfeiture
decisions the Court decided in the 1989 term. Before he wrote the
majority opinions in those cases, Justice White announced the Court's
89. Id. at 649.
90. That an indictment signifies probable cause as to anything is widely considered to be
nothing more than a convenient legal fiction. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d
1184, 1195 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the grand jury serves as a "rubber stamp" for the
prosecution and would "indict a ham sandwich" if so implored and that federal grand juries
returned only twenty-one no-bills in all of 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
91. United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985); accord United States v.
Roth, 912 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1990).
92. United States v. Melrose E. Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2004).
93. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 485 (1965)).
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decision in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana.9 4 That case concerned
pretrial seizures of forfeitable assets made under Indiana's racketeering
statute, an analogue to the federal RICO statute.95 Despite its close rela-
tionship to these other cases, Fort Wayne Books is infrequently dis-
cussed together with them presumably because it is considered a First
Amendment case while the others are considered Sixth Amendment
cases. In fact, all three involve similar Fourth Amendment seizures that
directly impact other constitutional rights. When viewed that way, Fort
Wayne Books provides a compelling precedent for analyzing the issue
left open in Monsanto Ill-how to decide whether the pretrial restraint
of allegedly forfeitable assets requires an adversarial hearing. Examina-
tion of the two cases also reveals an irreconcilable conflict between
them over the amount of evidence necessary to justify seizures frustrat-
ing the exercise of constitutional rights.
Indiana brought a civil racketeering complaint against Fort Wayne
Books and two corporations operating pornographic book and video
stores.96 Following an ex parte determination of probable cause, the
stores were padlocked and, a few days later, everything in them was
impounded.97 The trial court afforded the defendants an adversarial
hearing shortly thereafter on the question of probable cause to believe
the bookstores' contents were forfeitable as proceeds and instruments of
racketeering crimes. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the seizure, reasoning that, because the books and films were
found to be forfeitable, the First Amendment was not implicated. 98 Spe-
cifically, the court held that it was irrelevant whether the books and
videotapes were obscene and therefore beyond the First Amendment's
protection.99
The United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the seizure
was unconstitutional," ° even though the trial court conducted a post-
seizure, pretrial adversary hearing. 101 Significantly, the Court assumed
that the books and films were forfeitable like any other assets used in or
derived from racketeering. °2 Nonetheless, Justice White's majority
94. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
95. Id. at 50.
96. Id. at 50-51. The predicate acts underlying the alleged racketeering were obscenity
convictions. Id.
97. Id. at 52.
98. See id. at 64-65.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 66 ("Therefore, the pretrial seizure at issue here was improper."); id. at 70-71 ("The
Court correctly decides that ... the pretrial seizures to which petitioner ... was subjected are
unconstitutional.") (Stevens, J., dissenting on other grounds).
101. See id. at 52.
102. Id. at 65. Specifically, the Court stated that "we assume without deciding that bookstores
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held "that the special rules applicable to removing First Amendment
materials from circulation" applied because the purpose of the prosecu-
tion was to stop the dissemination of the seized works.° 3 Consequently,
the books and films could not be seized until they were adjudged
obscene or forfeited."° Mere "probable cause to believe a legal viola-
tion has transpired" would not suffice.'0°
In other words, the entire Court agreed that, although "the general
rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instru-
mentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable
cause ... ,it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the
First Amendment are involved."'0 6 This aversion to the risk that poten-
tially obscene works might be erroneously removed from circulation is
in marked contrast to the little regard the same Court displayed for the
risk that a criminal defendant might be erroneously deprived of his
counsel of choice. Yet, the three 1989 forfeiture cases evince no sound
reason for treating potential obscenity with greater constitutional rever-
ence than potential attorney's fees.
The rationale for treating expressive materials differently than other
property is the risk that their seizure will effect a "prior restraint"-an
abridgment of speech made prior to a judicial determination that the
speech is not constitutionally protected. 107 This means that seizures of
large stores of books and films must be accompanied by proof positive
of the seizure's ultimate legality so as not to compromise the dissemina-
tion of ideas. When the government seizes only one or two copies of an
allegedly obscene work for use as evidence, however, the special First
Amendment rules do not apply. In such instances, there is no serious
threat to speech because other copies may continue to circulate until the
trial is concluded.0 8 Rather, probable cause to believe the work is
obscene or otherwise illegal is then sufficient justification for the
seizure.' 09
and their contents are forfeitable (like other property such as a bank account or a yacht) when it is
proved that these items are property actually used in, or derived from, a pattern of violations of the
State's obscenity laws." Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 67 ("At least where the RICO violation claimed is a pattern of racketeering that can
be established only by rebutting the presumption that expressive materials are protected by the
First Amendment, that presumption is not rebutted until the claimed justification for seizing books
or other publications is properly established in an adversary proceeding.").
105. Id. at 66; see also Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 552 (1993) (holding that
expressive materials found obscene at trial as well as property found to be proceeds at trial could
be seized).
106. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 63.
107. Id. at 63-64.
108. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1986).
109. Id. This holding was unanimous as the dissenting justices argued only that the facts did
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Undoubtedly, a defendant is entitled to a pretrial adversarial hear-
ing to challenge any seizure with potential First Amendment ramifica-
tions. The Court made this clear in Heller v. New York, which upheld
the seizure of a single copy of an allegedly obscene film for use as evi-
dence. 1 ° Heller concerned a skin flick seized after a judge accompa-
nied police to a Greenwich Village theatre, bought a ticket, sat through a
screening, and then immediately issued a warrant."' The police, who
helpfully also attended the viewing, seized the film and arrested the the-
atre manager as well as the projectionist and the ticket taker, though
charges against these two were later dismissed." 2 The manager argued
in the Supreme Court that the seizure was unconstitutional because he
was not afforded an adversary hearing before the seizure. 1 3 Critical to
the rejection of the petitioner's argument was the Court's repeated
emphasis that an adversarial post-seizure hearing was available to the
theatre manager:
Petitioner made no pretrial motions seeking return of the film or chal-
lenging its seizure, nor did he request expedited judicial consideration
of the obscenity issue, so it is entirely possible that a prompt judicial
determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding could
have been obtained if petitioner had desired."'4
In contrast to the approach it took in Monsanto III, the Court did
not sidestep the question of whether a probable cause hearing was
required. Heller emphasized the point that such a hearing was required
and would have been granted." 5 In a footnote to the passage quoted just
above, the Court expressly noted that New York represented it would
have granted an immediate adversarial hearing had the theatre manager
made a motion." 16 Summarizing its holding, the Court made the availa-
bility of such adversarial hearings a necessary condition for seizing even
a single copy of an expressive work:
If such a seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination
of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and, following the seizure,
a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary
proceeding is available at the request of any interested party, the
not establish probable cause, not that a different standard should apply. Id. at 884 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
110. 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973) (noting lack of any claim that seizure "prevented continuing
exhibition of the film" pending trial).
Ill. Id. at 485.
112. Id. at 486 & n.3.
113. Id. at 487.
114. Id. at 490.
115. Id. at 490-91.
116. Id. at 490 n.6.
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seizure is constitutionally permissible.1 17
Heller thus demonstrates that the mention of the pretrial adversary
hearing afforded in Fort Wayne Books was not fortuitous. Rather, it
emphasized that providing an adversarial probable cause hearing was
insufficient when the contents of entire bookstores were seized. Justice
White's Fort Wayne Books majority was in that way remarkably respect-
ful of the defendant's right to distribute certainly pornographic and
likely obscene materials-even though they were allegedly racketeering
proceeds-until trial on the ultimate issue:
It is incontestable that these proceedings were begun to put an end to
the sale of obscenity at the three bookstores named in the complaint,
and hence we are quite sure that the special rules applicable to
removing First Amendment materials from circulation are relevant
here. This includes specifically the admonition that probable cause to
believe that there are valid grounds for seizure is insufficient to inter-
rupt the sale of presumptively protected books and films.' 18
His Caplin & Drysdale majority, in noteworthy contrast, implied that
the Republic can ill afford to allow criminal defendants to hire expen-
sive attorneys possessed of sufficient skill to pose a meaningful chal-
lenge to the government's case:
[A] major purpose motivating congressional adoption and continued
refinement of the racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations
(RICO) and CCE forfeiture provisions has been the desire to lessen
the economic power of organized crime and drug enterprises. This
includes the use of such economic power to retain private coun-
sel .... The notion that the Government has a legitimate interest in
depriving criminals of economic power, even insofar as that power is
used to retain counsel of choice, may be somewhat unsettling. But
when a defendant claims that he has suffered some substantial
impairment of his Sixth Amendment rights by virtue of the seizure or
forfeiture of assets in his possession, such a complaint is no more
than the reflection of "the harsh reality that the quality of a criminal
defendant's representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain
the best counsel money can buy."
1 19
No reason is apparent for why pornographic books and films derived
from racketeering are "presumptively protected" while other assets
derived from racketeering (or trafficking) are presumptively the materi-
alization of the "economic power of organized crime."
117. Id. at 492 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 492 n.9 (defining "prompt" as "shortest
period 'compatible with sound judicial resolution'").
118. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 65-66 (1988).
119. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (quoting Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (citations omitted).
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Were it not for this difference in slant, Fort Wayne Books would
supply the answer to the question left open in Monsanto Ill. When a
government seizure of allegedly forfeitable property might frustrate the
exercise of a constitutional right, Fort Wayne Books requires that the
government show more than mere probable cause.' 20 Rather, it requires
that the government establish the forfeitability of the contested assets by
the same quantum of evidence necessary to prove the forfeiture. If the
mere risk of prior restraint suffices to keep potentially obscene materials
in circulation until they are definitively ruled obscene, the risk that a
defendant will be denied his counsel of choice and may be unfairly con-
victed likewise should require proof of forfeitability before assets are
restrained. '21
Monsanto III, of course, expressly forecloses this analysis and
thereby creates a dichotomy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. With-
out once citing Fort Wayne Books, Monsanto III rejected the argument
that the government should have to show more than probable cause to
restrain assets, reasoning that the criminal defendant himself can be
seized on a showing of only probable cause. 122  (Of course, the same
was true of the bookstore employees charged in Fort Wayne Books but
120. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 66.
121. Preponderance of the evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would be the
appropriate standard because the courts of appeals require that criminal forfeiture be established
by only a preponderance of the evidence, as forfeiture is a penalty and not a charge. See United
States v. Jones, 502 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 526
n.2 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 697 (11 th Cir. 1992).
122. United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto 111), 491 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1989) (citing United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Bail Reform Act of 1984
which allowed inter alia pretrial detention without bond in cases of serious felony)).
Interestingly, the government recently used that same argument to contend that an accused should
not be allowed to challenge whether there is a probable cause to believe that indicted crimes
underlying a forfeiture claim were committed. United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 420
(D.C. Cit. 2008). Specifically, the government claimed that, as the grand jury's probable cause
finding is sufficient to arrest and detain the defendant, it should likewise suffice to seize his
property, assuming the government can show probable cause to believe the property is linked to
the charged crimes. Id. The court of appeals rejected that claim on the basis that property rights
were of a different nature than liberty rights:
This might perhaps be a more compelling argument if the interest invaded were not
only lesser, but included. However, the interests of the defendants in their property
stand independent of their interests in their freedom. Defendants deprived of liberty
pending trial either by imprisonment or by limitation under bail bond normally have
full property rights in whatever they owned before indictment and in many, if not
most, cases will retain those interests even if convicted. And they may use that
property to retain counsel .... The historic power, indeed the necessary power, of
the state to limit liberty interests of those persons as to whom probable cause exists
warranting a criminal trial are normally irrelevant to other constitutional or even
statutory or common law rights.
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their books nonetheless could be seized only with additional evi-
dence. 23) This suggests that the distribution of potentially obscene
materials is more important than affording the best representation to the
criminally accused. There is no explanation as to why the Court
believed this or why it drew no connection between Fort Wayne Books
and Monsanto III, although they were decided within a few weeks of
each other.
Nor is the reason for affording greater solicitude to the right to
distribute pornography than to the right to retain counsel so obvious that
no explanation is necessary. Certainly, Indiana's legislators were at
least as motivated to remove obscenity from circulation as Congress was
to deprive criminals of "economic power." Justice White's opinions
considered together, however, appear to view the sale of a potentially
obscene movie as more tolerable than the sale of a high-priced legal
defense to a potentially guilty defendant. The obvious, if cynical, expla-
nation is that Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale echo the popular
misconception that expensive attorneys win the release of guilty and
dangerous criminals through trickery or "technicalities" and are there-
fore a greater evil than obscene works."2 4 This pernicious idea is not
rooted in an unflinching commitment to bring criminals to justice but,
rather, reflects a fundamental lack of faith in our criminal justice system,
unbecoming of anyone involved with it.
Even if one accepts the bizarre proposition that a robust market in
pornography is more socially valuable than a robust market in criminal
defense attorneys, Fort Wayne Books and Monsanto III remain funda-
mentally irreconcilable. This is true if only because controversial speak-
ers, like the defendant pornography peddlers in Fort Wayne Books, need
good defense lawyers as much as they need the First Amendment to
safeguard their freedom of speech. 125 In other words, as the right to
counsel is necessary to vindicate the right to free speech, the latter can-
123. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 50-51 ("On March 19, 1984, the State of Indiana and a
local prosecutor, respondents here, filed a civil action against the three corporations and certain of
their employees alleging that defendants had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by
repeatedly violating the state laws barring the distribution of obscene books and films, thereby
violating the State's RICO law.").
124. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REv. 670, 709-10 (1992) (characterizing the Court's
view of high-priced criminal defense attorneys as reflecting the notion that the "power to buy
fancy lawyers may in fact be worse than the power to buy fancy houses, because the latter does
not facilitate the commission of further crimes as the former can").
125. If, for example, the government had seized enough of Fort Wayne Books' money to
destroy its ability to retain counsel in the racketeering prosecution, that seizure would equally
threaten its ability to continue selling its books and videos. Would that seizure have been required
to meet the Court's "special rules" for seizures implicating the First Amendment?
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not be said to be more valuable than the former. 26  It is also true
because the Fourth Amendment's protection of property does not vary
depending on whether the individual invoking it is alleged to be dealing
in obscenity or dealing in drugs. Property is constitutionally protected
from seizure until the government demonstrates that it has good reason
to seize it. Where such a seizure would impact on the exercise of some
constitutional right, whether it is the right to speak freely or the right to
hire defense counsel, an adversary hearing should be conducted with the
utmost care and with a healthy skepticism for the government's
allegations.
VI. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN SIXTH AMENDMENT CASES
Accepting for the sake of argument the different treatment that
Monsanto III and Fort Wayne Books inexplicably provide for seizures
impacting the right to distribute expressive works and those impacting
the right to retain counsel, Fort Wayne Books is nonetheless instructive
on the question left open in Monsanto 111.127 Understanding pretrial
restraints of contested assets earmarked for attorney's fees as Fourth
Amendment seizures that directly infringe upon the right to counsel
rather than as direct violations of the Sixth Amendment clarifies the pro-
cedures and burdens that must be satisfied. Fort Wayne Books, relying
on Heller, emphasizes that an adversarial hearing must be promptly pro-
vided whenever a defendant contests a seizure. 28 The government must
present evidence substantiating both the underlying charges and the for-
feitability of the assets.' 29 Under Monsanto III, the government can
126. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-52 (2006) (holding that denial
of counsel of choice is structural error not subject to harmless-error review); Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 644-48 (1989) (discussing importance of the right to
retain private counsel of choice) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d
1316, 1326 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases on the rights of nonindigent defendants to
counsel of choice).
127. It should be emphasized, however, that the inconsistency between Fort Wayne Books and
Monsanto III is absurd. If allegedly obscene works cannot be removed from circulation without
proof of their obscenity, then the government should not be able to restrain assets without proof of
their forfeitability. It is difficult to believe that the Constitution provides that American society
can never be deprived of any pornography-even temporarily until trial-but readily tolerates,
despite the Sixth Amendment, convictions of some innocent people who were deprived of the
means to defend themselves. The Fort Wayne Books rationale should be applied to require that
assets intended for attorney's fees cannot be restrained without proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that they will be forfeited.
128. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 63 (discussing cases invalidating seizures of
books "without a prior adversarial hearing on their obscenity"); id. at 67 (holding that the
"presumption that expressive materials are protected by the First Amendment ... is not rebutted
until the claimed justification for seizing books or other publications is properly established in an
adversary proceeding").
129. Id. at 66 ("The elements of a RICO violation other than the predicate crimes remain to be
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meet its burden by showing probable cause that the crimes were com-
mitted and that the contested assets are proceeds or instrumentalities.
Just as a defendant in an obscenity case need not demonstrate a need to
sell titillating books or videos, 3 ° a drug or racketeering defendant
should not have to demonstrate that he needs contested assets to pay his
attorney. It is enough that the defendant merely wishes to use the con-
tested assets to fund his defense. 1 ' Only the Eleventh Circuit provides
none of these protections. 
132
The presumption that the government cannot seize any property in
one's possession without satisfying the Fourth Amendment is as vener-
able as the presumption that all expressive works are protected by the
First Amendment. That the underlying purpose of government is to pro-
tect individual property rights is central to the notion of "unalienable
Rights" upon which America's sovereignty was first rooted.' 33 Indeed,
the common law's regard for property predates American independence:
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."'134 For this reason, the common law, even before adoption of
the Fourth Amendment, provided that one whose property was seized
was entitled to immediately challenge the seizure. 35  Moreover, the
maxim that "possession is nine-tenths of the law" has been integral to
the development of American property law, suggesting that a defen-
dant's possession of property is entitled to consideration and ought to be
decisive where the government offers no proof to support a forfeiture
claim. 1
36
established in this case; e.g., whether the obscenity violations by the three corporations or their
employees established a pattern of racketeering activity, and whether the assets seized were
forfeitable under the State's CRRA statute. Therefore, the pretrial seizure at issue here was
improper.").
130. A defendant in such a case, for example, would never be forced to demonstrate that the
books or videos he is selling are not otherwise available to those wishing to buy them pending
trial.
131. Not requiring any showing of need will ensure a healthy market in criminal defense
attorneys in the same way that not requiring a showing of need to sell pornography ensures a
healthy market of expressive works.
132. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
133. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); William Michael Treanor,
Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1020 (1988).
134. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell's State Trials. 1029, as reprinted in (1765) 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (partial reprint).
135. See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 82 (1969).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) now codifies this procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g)
("A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of
property may move for the property's return."). The Eleventh Circuit, in Bissell, seemed to
understand this, as it noted without elaboration that the defendants failed to make a motion
pursuant to Rule 41. See United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1353 (11th Cir. 1989).
136. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Ashley, 180 U.S. 59, 63 (1900) ("Generally speaking, the
presumption is that the person in possession is the owner .... If there be no evidence to the
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The Fourth Amendment, which embodies the common law's solici-
tude for property rights, does not afford books and videos greater protec-
tion than other types of property. 137  Their seizure does not require a
prompt, adversarial hearing because of their nature as expressive works
but more precisely because seizing that type of property implicates
another constitutional right, the right to free speech. (The seizure of a
political blogger's computer, for example, would undoubtedly trigger
the same protections even though the computer itself is not an expres-
sive work.) In that sense, seized books are constitutionally indistin-
guishable from assets that may be used to exercise the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Just as the law leaves no doubt that a bookseller is
absolutely entitled to an adversary probable cause hearing if even one
copy of a book is seized, so too must a criminal defendant be guaranteed
a hearing to contest the seizure of any asset that might fund his defense.
This is true regardless of whether he has other assets, just as the book-
seller is entitled to a hearing even if he retains other copies of a seized
book.
Following the Tenth Circuit's lead, some courts of appeals provide
adversarial hearings to challenge a seizure only for defendants who
show they need the contested assets to fund their defense.138  This
allows the government to seize relatively wealthy defendants' assets
without a hearing, while relatively poor defendants are entitled to a hear-
contrary, proof of possession, at least under a color of right, is sufficient proof of title."); Ricard v.
Williams, 20 U.S. 59, 105 (1822) ("Undoubtedly, if a person be found in possession of land .... it
is prima facie evidence of his ownership ...."); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 241 (1881) ("The consequences attached to possession are substantially those
attached to ownership, subject to the question of the continuance of possessory rights ...."). But
see United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Although
we are familiar with the maxim, 'possession is nine-tenths of the law,' we prefer to apply the
remaining one-tenth [in the context of an in rem forfeiture action] .... ).
137. See Bascuas, supra note 66 (arguing that Fourth Amendment protects property and
protects all types of property equally).
138. See United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir. 1998) ("As a preliminary matter,
a defendant must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that she has no assets, other than those
restrained, with which to retain private counsel and provide for herself and her family."). The
Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a district court's use of the Jones test. Though neither the
government nor the defendant disputed the validity of Jones, the Sixth Circuit expressly stated that
a pretrial hearing was constitutionally required, noting "that the opportunity to be heard is non-
existent when a district court grants a restraining order based only on the indictment." United
States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide
whether a post-restraint, pretrial hearing is required but has held that none is required if a
defendant's family can pay his lawyer. United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 793 (7th
Cir. 1998). The D.C. Circuit has not decided whether defendants should be entitled to a hearing
even "when the assets are not necessary to obtaining counsel of choice." United States v. E-Gold,
Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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ing. 139 This is not an insignificant problem but a constitutional one. In
effect, the government and the courts can dictate which assets a rela-
tively wealthy defendant can transfer and which he cannot, potentially
forcing the defendant to liquidate assets he would prefer to keep-such
as his house, family heirlooms, or jewelry or art of sentimental value. ' 4 0
The Jones requirement thus causes the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections to vary according to wealth only to spare the government and
the courts the trouble of a constitutionally mandated hearing. A rela-
tively wealthy defendant should not be forced to liquidate uncontested
assets based on the government's bare assertion that his other, more liq-
uid, less sentimental assets are forfeitable. This is akin to seizing all
copies of an allegedly obscene book and advising the bookseller that he
is free to exercise his First Amendment rights by selling other books in
his store.
Thus, a defendant's desire to use contested assets to fund his
defense suffices to invoke the most scrupulous application of Fourth
Amendment protections. Forcing a defendant to part with assets he
would prefer to keep without requiring the government to so much as
demonstrate probable cause in an adversarial hearing denigrates pre-
sumptive property rights while burdening the right to select counsel.
The Jones court's denial of a hearing until a defendant demonstrates
financial need for contested assets cannot be squared with the height-
ened Fourth Amendment procedures afforded purveyors of potentially
obscene works.
Reconceptualizing pretrial asset seizures on the model prescribed
by Fort Wayne Books leaves no doubt that, despite Monsanto III's fail-
ure to reach the issue, a hearing must be provided. It also requires that
the government adduce evidence to support the underlying charges and
the forfeitability of the contested assets if the defendant wishes to use
them for his defense. Furthermore, it leads to the conclusion that
defense attorneys paid with assets that the government has not already
shown to be forfeitable are bona fide purchasers for value. In other
words, it relieves defense attorneys of the obligation to investigate the
source of their legitimately earned fees and treats them just as other
providers of goods and services are treated.
139. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d at 792 (affirming denial of hearing where defendant did not
demonstrate that wife or other family members would not fund defense).
140. It is worth noting that the Fort Wayne Books and Monsanto III dichotomy produces
absurd results in this context. The defendants in Fort Wayne Books could continue selling the
allegedly forfeitable books, absent proof from the government as to their forfeitability. They
could thus fund their representation by continuing to deal in potentially obscene works. Under
Bissell, however, other defendants cannot similarly fund their defense because the contraband they
sell is not even arguably an expressive work.
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VII. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AS BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
A further Fourth Amendment problem with the prevailing interpre-
tation of the forfeiture statutes is that it allows assets to be forfeited
whenever they are transferred to someone who knew of the govern-
ment's forfeiture allegations. This allows the government to take any
contested assets paid to a defense attorney, who was naturally aware of
the allegations, at the end of the case. Worse, nothing currently prevents
the government from claiming those assets even in cases in which it
failed to establish prior to trial probable cause to restrain the assets. Of
course, few if any attorneys would do work in exchange for contested
assets in such circumstances.' 4 ' An accused can thereby be effectively
precluded from retaining counsel with contested assets, even when
courts afford an adversarial hearing and the government fails to meet its
burden.'42 The flaw in this interpretation is that awareness of govern-
ment allegations cannot be sufficient reason to disqualify an attorney, or
anyone else, from being a bona fide purchaser of contested assets.
The Fourth Amendment requires, rather, that the government's fail-
ure to establish probable cause signify that individuals with actual
knowledge of the government's unsubstantiated allegations can accept
contested assets as payment for legitimate services without fear of hav-
ing them later disgorged. This is so because the Fourth Amendment
bars seizures of property without probable cause, 143 and preventing a
defendant from using assets presumptively belonging to him to hire an
attorney amounts to a seizure. Thus, until the government establishes its
claim by a sufficient evidentiary showing, a defendant cannot be pre-
vented from exchanging, nor an attorney from accepting, contested
assets as payment for legitimate services. Requiring that probable cause
be demonstrated before an accused is deprived of the use of his money
will of course put some money that would otherwise have been forfeited
into the pockets of defense attorneys. 144 But, under our system of jus-
tice, the consequences of postponing or failing to make the requisite
141. See supra note 17.
142. See United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292, 1295 n.4 (1 th Cir. 2003) (suggesting in
dicta that an attorney ceases to be even arguably a bona fide purchaser with regard to legal
services rendered when he learns that his client is indicted and "learns additional information
about his client's guilt"). While it suggests that an indictment alone will not suffice, McCorkle's
vague criteria begs the question ofjust what "additional information" would suffice to disqualify a
creditor as a bona fide purchaser.
143. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 66 (1992) (holding that seizures of property "can be
justified only if they meet the probable-cause standard and if they are unaccompanied by unlawful
trespass") (internal citations omitted).
144. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (discussing
Congress's intent to lessen the economic power of criminal enterprises, including the use of such
power to retain private counsel).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
probable cause showing must necessarily fall upon the government, not
the lawyer providing legitimate advocacy.
45
The racketeering and drug-crime forfeiture statutes can readily be
interpreted to avoid any Fourth Amendment problem, but they have not
been so interpreted. Both require that one to whom funds have been
transferred establish that "he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such
property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture .... 146 The phrase
"subject to forfeiture" is ambiguous. In this context, it is susceptible of
two interpretations. "Subject to" can denote a potential eventuality
("packages are subject to search") or a necessary eventuality ("animals
are subject to aging").
Most circuits, including the Eleventh, adopt the former interpreta-
tion, contending that any assets that potentially might be forfeited must
be preserved in case the jury finds guilt. This means that a criminal
defense attorney can never be a "bona fide purchaser" under the forfei-
ture statutes because he is necessarily aware that the assets might be
forfeited.'47 This interpretation of the statutes thus puts the onus of
investigating a defendant's funds on the defense attorney rather than on
the government, for example, prompting Roy Black to hire Ben Kuehne.
So, without having to adduce even enough evidence to convince a judge
that there is probable cause to believe the contested assets will be for-
feited, the government by mere allegation prevents a defendant from
using his assets to hire an attorney.
This result is every bit as much a "meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests"' 48 as the government's taking a repre-
sentative copy of an allegedly obscene book. In fact, it is much more
like the seizure of an entire store of books for the purpose of preventing
their circulation. Seizing a representative copy of an expressive work at
most chills speech by discouraging the defendant and perhaps other pur-
veyors of controversial works from continuing to sell other copies.
Preventing a defendant from hiring his counsel of choice does not
merely chill the exercise of the right to counsel but totally frustrates
it.149 Like the bookstore seizures in Fort Wayne Books, it is an unconsti-
145. This is equally true where the government makes the strategic decision to forego a pretrial
restraint to avoid disclosing its evidence in an adversarial pretrial hearing.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2000).
147. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1349 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("It is unlikely that an
attorney will ever achieve [bona-fide-purchaser-for-value] status since he is the most likely person
to appreciate the forfeitability of his client's assets.").
148. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
149. The fact that the government will supply the defendant with a lawyer of its choosing, see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963), is entirely beside the point. The Sixth
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tutional interference with property rights that is only compounded by the
fact that it is intended to foreclose the exercise of another constitutional
right.
However, if "subject to" is interpreted in the stricter sense, then the
government's mere assertion of forfeitability would not suffice to render
anyone aware of the charges ineligible for bona fide purchaser status.
Assets that the government claims might be forfeited would not be "sub-
ject to" forfeiture. Rather, to satisfy the statutory condition, an indepen-
dent, neutral judge would have to preside over an adversary hearing and
find that there exists at least probable cause to believe the particular
assets will be forfeited. Only then would a defense attorney cease to be
"reasonably without cause to believe" that forfeiture will ensue. Ordina-
rily, any fees earned prior to that judicial determination would belong to
the attorney as a bona fide purchaser for value. 50 This understanding
relieves the defense bar of having to investigate client assets, a burden
that the Fourth Amendment places squarely on the sovereign.
The stricter interpretation of "subject to forfeiture" is consistent
with Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto III. In Caplin & Drysdale, the
defendant paid his attorneys with money that had been restrained.'
5'
Whether the law firm was entitled to be paid for work performed before
the government established probable cause to believe the defendant's
assets were forfeitable was not at issue in either the Supreme Court or
the Fourth Circuit.'52 On the contrary, the law firm conceded that the
assets in question were forfeitable because it sought payment for work
done after the defendant pled guilty.'3 Likewise, in Monsanto III, the
Amendment protects the right of a defendant to hire whatever counsel he prefers. See supra note
126.
150. One can imagine extraordinary cases where a defense attorney or other creditor learns that
he is being paid with tainted funds despite the government's lack of evidence. Cf United States v.
Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660, 665-66 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming forfeiture from
law firm that accepted $103,800 in legal fees paid in cash under "to put it mildly, highly
suspicious" circumstances). Accepting payment in such a situation would in any event likely
expose the individual accepting the funds to money-laundering charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956
(2000). The point is that in our adversarial system a defense attorney has no more duty than any
other creditor to investigate the source of his client's money. That is the government's
responsibility.
151. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 620 (1989); see also id. at
640 n.7 (characterizing the majority holding as authorizing the seizure of assets on a showing of
probable cause) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 617-35; In re Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.
1987).
153. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d at 642 ("The specific listing of the assets in
the indictment and the payment of their fee in cash gave the attorneys representing Reckmeyer
ample cause to know that the funds were forfeitable under 21 U.S.C. § 853. They have
acknowledged that they have no claim to make under the clear terms of § 853(n).") In fact, the
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Court made it expressly clear that assets can be frozen only "based on a
finding of probable cause to believe that the assets are forfeitable."'
5 4
Thus, neither Monsanto III nor Caplin & Drysdale forecloses interpret-
ing "subject to forfeiture" as requiring more than awareness of the gov-
ernment's allegations to disqualify a defense attorney as a bona fide
purchaser.
Interpreting "subject to forfeiture" as calling for the constitutionally
required probable cause finding is also consistent with the purpose
underlying the statutes' exception for bona fide purchasers for value.1
55
The statutes would still operate to keep the accused from transferring
assets in exchanges that are not at arm's length-precisely those that are
typically distinguished from bona fide transactions. 56 It would recog-
nize, in contrast to current law, that defense attorneys undertake valuable
work-indeed, constitutionally required work-in arm' s-length transac-
tions and are as entitled to compensation as anyone else.
157
VIII. CONCLUSION
Any statutory scheme that allows the government to prevent a crim-
inal defendant's retention of counsel on the basis of untested allegations
raises Fourth Amendment problems. It incorrectly presumes that the
government can prevent the alienation of property, thereby seizing it,
without making any evidentiary showing. This same problem persists
when preclusive effect is not given to the government's failure to adduce
evidence sufficient to justify a seizure at a pretrial adversarial hearing.
Such asset seizures have a pernicious effect on the criminal justice sys-
tem by introducing conflicts into the attorney-client relationship and, in
turn, undermining the adversarial nature of our system of justice. 158
court of appeals' opinion arguably suggests that the law firm was treated just as any other third-
party claimant, i.e., without ascribing significance to its awareness of the government's
allegations. Id. at 641 ("The clear terms of the statute subject a defendant's assets to forfeiture
without regard to whether he intends to use them to pay an attorney. Similarly, the statute
exempts only those third parties who have prior claims or are bona fide purchasers, without regard
to whether they are attorneys.").
154. United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto 111), 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989).
155. 18 U.S.C. 1963(c), (1)(6)(B) (2000).
156. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 200-01 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3383-84 (stating that purpose of forfeiture provisions was "to permit the voiding of certain pre-
conviction transfers and so close a potential loophole in current law whereby the criminal
forfeiture sanction could be avoided by transfers that were not 'arm's length' transactions.").
157. This reading eliminates any need to craft differing rules for money to be used for
attorney's fees as opposed to food, medicine, or housing. See Fork, supra note 11, at 234-37
(proposing statutory interpretation premised on asserted lack of congressional intent to expose
attorney's fees to forfeiture).
158. Any statutory scheme that requires defense attorneys to investigate prospective clients to
determine whether their attorney's fees are paid from criminal proceeds or are commingled with
criminal proceeds raises the objection that it unconstitutionally undermines the adversarial
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Finally, it discourages talented attorneys who would otherwise pursue
criminal defense work from undertaking such representation, just as
seizures of controversial books and videos can chill freedom of
expression.
Less than two months after Ben Kuehne's indictment sparked out-
rage, the United States indicated that it was considering a voluntary dis-
missal of the charges. 59 As of this writing, the case remains pending.
Even if the charges are eventually dismissed, the case already has shown
how the courts' failure to put the government to the burden imposed
upon it by the Fourth Amendment emboldens prosecutors to undermine
the procedures of justice in pursuit of a desired end result.' 60 Analyzing
the seizure of contested assets earmarked for attorney's fees as potential
Fourth Amendment violations equal in gravity to the seizure of poten-
tially obscene works would make such tactical prosecutions impossible
and harmonize the confused jurisprudence governing such seizures.
process. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution presupposes an adversarial system and
that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is intended to guarantee that. See, e.g.,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) ("[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is
accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and ... the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.").
Allowing the government to co-opt the accused's counsel as an agent of its investigation via threat
of taking the attorney's earned fees (to say nothing of potentially prosecuting the attorney for
money laundering) represents a substantial step toward inquisitorial justice. Cf Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976) ("That [adversarial] system is undermined when a
government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling
self-incriminating disclosures."). Development of this argument, however, is beyond the scope of
this article.
159. John Pacenti, New Prosecutors Consider Dropping Some Charges Against Attorney
Accused of Laundering Drug Profits, LAW.COM, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1206614816222.
160. The Kuehne prosecution shows that Justice Blackmun's grim predictions of how
forfeiture would be used to undermine the availability of counsel fell short of what has occurred:
"The Government will be ever tempted to use the forfeiture weapon against a defense attorney
who is particularly talented or aggressive on the client's behalf-the attorney who is better than
what, in the Government's view, the defendant deserves." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617, 650 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
